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National Security, National 
Origin, and the Constitution: 75 
Years After EO9066† 
Geoffrey R. Stone† 
 
I am honored to have the opportunity to address this issue, not 
only because of its importance in American history, but also because 
of the lessons we must learn from our own experience. It is essential 
for us to remember, perhaps especially at the present moment, what 
we as a nation are capable of. We must never forget that we are capa-
ble of doing things we might under other circumstances never imag-
ine. We must always be vigilant and we must always remember that 
“it” can happen here. 
As history teaches, war fever often translates into xenophobia. To 
some extent this is understandable, for in wartime individuals with a 
connection to an enemy nation are, in fact, more likely to pose risks of 
espionage, sabotage and subversion. But how a nation addresses these 
concerns speaks volumes about its values, its sense of fairness, and its 
willingness to judge individuals as individuals. 
I 
Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, killed more 
than 2,000 Americans and destroyed much of the Pacific fleet.1 
Within the next few days, the United States declared war against 
Japan, Germany, and Italy.2 Two months later, on February 19, 1942, 
President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which 
authorized the army “to designate the military areas from which any 
or all persons may be excluded.”3 Although the words “Japanese” or 
 
*  The following is based upon a transcript of Professor Stone’s presentation at 
the symposium, National Security, National Origin, and the Constitution on 
November 17, 2017, at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.  
†  Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of 
Chicago Law School.  
1. Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime 286 
(2004); Hawai’i Chronicles III: World War Two in Hawai’i, in Paradise 
of the Pacific 37 (Bob Dye ed., 2000).  
2. Stone, supra note 1, at 286; Joint Resolution of December 8, 1941, Pub. 
L. No. 77-328, 55 Stat 795.  
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“Japanese American” never appeared in the order, it was understood 
to apply only to persons of Japanese ancestry.4 
Over the next eight months, almost 120,000 individuals of 
Japanese descent were ordered to leave their homes in California, 
Washington, Oregon, and Arizona.5 Two-thirds of these individuals 
were American citizens, representing almost 90 percent of all Japanese 
Americans.6 No charges were brought against these individuals. There 
were no hearings. They did not know where they were going, how 
long they would be detained, what conditions they would face, or 
what fate would await them. They were ordered to bring only what 
they could carry, and most families lost everything.7 
On the orders of military police, these men, women, and children 
were assigned to temporary detention camps, which had been set up 
in converted racetracks and fairgrounds.8 Many families lived in 
crowded horse stalls, often in unsanitary conditions.9 Barbed wire 
fences and armed guard towers surrounded the compounds.10 
From there, the internees were transported to one of ten perma-
nent internment camps, which were located in isolated areas in wind-
swept deserts or vast swamplands.11 Men, women, and children were 
confined in overcrowded rooms with no furniture other than cots. 
They once again found themselves surrounded by barbed wire and 
military police, and there they remained for three years.12 
 
3. Stone, supra note 1, at 286 (quoting Exec. Order No. 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 
(Cum. Supp. 1943).  
4. Stone, supra note 1, at 286; 3 C.F.R. 1092–93. 
5. Stone, supra note 1, at 287; Fu-jen Chen & Su-lin Yu, Reclaiming the 
Southwest: A Traumatic Space in the Japanese American Internment 
Narrative, 47 J. Sw. 551, 552 (2005).  
6. Stone, supra note 1, at 287; accord Timothy P. Maga, Ronald Reagan 
and Redress for Japanese-American Internment, 28 Presidential Stud. 
Q. 606, 607 (1998).  
7. Stone, supra note 1, at 287; accord Maga, supra note 6, at 607.  
8. Stone, supra note 1, at 287; Jason Scott Smith, New Deal Public Works at 
War: The WPA and Japanese American Internment, 72 Pac. Hist. Rev. 
63, 73 (2003).  
9. Stone, supra note 1, at 287; Smith, supra note 8, at 73.  
10. Stone, supra note 1, at 287; accord Kristine C. Kuramitsu, Internment 
and Identity in Japanese American Art, 47 Am. Q. 619, 622 (1995). 
11. Stone, supra note 1, at 287; accord Kuramitsu, supra note 10, at 620.  
12. Stone, supra note 1, at 287; Brian Masaru Hayashi, Democratizing 
the Enemy: The Japanese American Internment 88, 91–92 (2004); 
Kuramitsu, supra note 10, at 620. 
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All of this was done even though there was not a single docu-
mented act of espionage, sabotage, or treasonable activity by any 
American of Japanese descent.13 
Why did this happen? Certainly, the days following Pearl Harbor 
were dark days for the American spirit. Fear of possible Japanese 
sabotage and espionage was rampant, and an outraged public felt an 
understandable desire to lash out at those who had attacked the 
nation.14 But this act was also very much an extension of more than a 
century of racial prejudice against what was termed the “yellow per-
il.”15 Laws passed in the early 1900s denied immigrants from Japan 
the right to become naturalized American citizens, to own land, and 
to marry outside of their race.16 In 1924, immigration from Japan was 
halted altogether.17 
Nonetheless, in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, there 
was no clamor for the mass internment of Japanese aliens or Japanese 
Americans. Attorney General Francis Biddle assured the nation that 
there would be “no indiscriminate, large-scale raids” on American citi-
zens.18 The military governor of Hawaii assured Japanese Americans 
that “there is no intention or desire on the part of federal authorities 
to operate mass concentration camps.”19 
Eleanor Roosevelt announced that “no law-abiding” Americans 
“of any nationality would be discriminated against by the govern-
ment”20 and Judge Jerome Frank—a distinguished federal judge and 
 
13. Stone, supra note 1, at 287; see Commission on Wartime Relocation 
and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied 95–96 (1983) 
[hereinafter CWRIC] (discussing the lack of congressional challenges to 
Executive Order 9066 despite the absence of espionage evidence). 
14. Stone, supra note 1, at 287; CWRIC, supra note 13, at 67–68. 
15. Stone, supra note 1, at 287. 
16. Id.; Keith Aoki, No Right to Own: The Early Twentieth-Century Alien 
Land Laws as a Prelude to Internment, 19 B.C. Third World L.J. 37, 
38–39 (1998). 
17. Stone, supra note 1, at 287; see Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 222 
(1923) (upholding Washington Alien Land Law); Porerfield v. Webb, 263 
U.S. 225, 233 (1923) (upholding California Alien Land Law); Ozawa v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) (upholding policy making Japanese 
immigrants ineligible for naturalized citizenship); Peter Irons, Justice 
at War 12 (1983).  
18. Stone, supra note 1, at 289; 1942 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 14. 
19. Stone, supra note 1, at 289; Jane L. Scheiber, Internal Security, the 
Japanese Problem, and the Kibei in World War II Hawaii, 35 U. Haw. L. 
Rev. 415, 425 (2013). 
20. Stone, supra note 1, at 289; Greg Robinson, By Order of the 
President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans 71 
(2001).  
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close friend of President Franklin Roosevelt—observed that “[i]f ever 
any Americans go to a concentration camp, American democracy will 
go with them.”21 Moreover, on December 10, three days after Pearl 
Harbor, FBI director J. Edgar Hoover reported that almost all the 
persons of foreign ancestry that the FBI had identified as possible 
threats to the national security had already been taken into custody.22  
In the weeks that followed, however, a demand for the removal of 
all persons of Japanese ancestry reached a crescendo along the West 
Coast.23 The motivations for this outburst of anxiety were many and 
complex. Certainly, it was fed by fears of a Japanese invasion.24 By 
mid-January, California was awash in unfounded rumors of Japanese 
sabotage and espionage. General John DeWitt, the top army com-
mander on the West Coast, was determined not to be caught up short 
as his counterpart had been in Hawaii. Several days after Pearl 
Harbor, DeWitt reported as fact rumors that a squadron of enemy 
airplanes had passed over California, that there was a planned up-
rising of 20,0000 Japanese Americans in San Francisco, and that 
Japanese Americans were aiding submarines by signaling them from 
the shore.25 The FBI and other government agencies promptly de-
bunked all of those rumors as false.26 
On January 2, the Joint Immigration Committee of the California 
legislature issued a manifesto falsely charging that American citizens 
of Japanese descent could “be called to bear arms for their Emperor” 
and that Japanese-language schools were teaching students that 
“every Japanese, wherever born or residing,” owed primary allegiance 
to “his Emperor and to Japan.”27 
Two days later, the newspaper columnist Damon Runyon erro-
neously reported that a radio transmitter had been discovered in a 
rooming house that catered to Japanese residents. Who could 
 
21. Stone, supra note 1, at 289; Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, 
Years of Triumph 217 (1985).  
22. Stone, supra note 1, at 290; Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Race, Rights 
and Reparation: Law and the Japanese American Internment 97 
(2001).  
23. Stone, supra note 1, at 290; Yamamoto et al., supra note 22, at 97–98. 
24. Stone, supra note 1, at 290; Irons, supra note 17, at 26–27. 
25. Stone, supra note 1, at 290; Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, 
Democratic Constitution 206 (2d ed. 2015). 
26. Stone, supra note 1, at 290; Robinson, supra note 20, at 84–85; Irons, 
supra note 17, at 26–27, 280–84.  
27. Stone, supra note 1, at 291; CWRIC, supra note 13, at 67–68. 
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“doubt,” he asked, “the continued existence of enemy agents among 
the Japanese population?”28 
On January 14, Congressman Leland Ford insisted that the 
United States place “all Japanese, whether citizens or not,” in “inland 
concentration camps,” and the American Legion demanded the intern-
ment of all 93,000 individuals of Japanese extraction then living in 
California.29 
Such demands were further ignited by the January 25 report of 
the Commission on Pearl Harbor, which was chaired by Supreme 
Court Justice Owen Roberts.30 The report, which was hastily re-
searched and written, erroneously asserted that persons of Japanese 
ancestry in Hawaii had facilitated Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.31 A 
few days later, a journalist, Henry McLemore, wrote a column in the 
San Francisco Examiner calling for “the immediate removal of every 
Japanese on the West Coast.”32 He added, “Personally, I hate the 
Japanese. And that goes for all of them.”33 
On February 4, California Governor Culbert Olson declared in a 
radio address that it was “much easier” to determine the loyalty of 
Italian and German aliens than of Japanese Americans.34 “All 
Japanese people,” he added, “will recognize this fact.”35 
In a similar vein, California’s attorney general and future Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, Earl Warren, argued that whereas it 
was relatively easy to find out which German or Italian Americans 
were loyal, it was simply too difficult to determine which Americans 
of Japanese ancestry were loyal and which were not.36 In Warren’s 
words, when dealing with the Caucasian race, there were methods to 
test their loyalty, but the Japanese were different, because “if the 
 
28. Stone, supra note 1, at 291; Ed Cray, Chief Justice: A Biography of 
Earl Warren 117 (1997). 
29. Stone, supra note 1, at 291; Cray, supra note 28, at 117; Irons, supra 
note 17, at 38. 
30. Stone, supra note 1, at 291; see generally Attack Upon Pearl Harbor 
by Japanese Armed Forces, S. Doc. No. 77-159 (1942). 
31. Stone, supra note 1, at 291–92; Gary Y. Okihiro, The Columbia 
Guide to Asian American History 116 (2001). 
32. Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Yamamoto et al., supra note 22, at 99. 
33. Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Yamamoto et al., supra note 22, at 99. 
34. Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Cray, supra note 28, at 117. 
35. Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Cray, supra note 28, at 117. 
36. Stone, supra note 1, at 292. 
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Japs are free, no one will be able to tell a saboteur from any other 
Jap.”37 
General DeWitt initially resisted demands for “wholesale intern-
ment,” insisting that “we can weed [out] the disloyal [from] the loyal 
and lock them up, if necessary.”38 In early January, he condemned the 
idea of mass internment as “damned nonsense,” but as political pres-
sure mounted, DeWitt changed his tune.39 In late January he stated, 
“[t]he Japanese race is an enemy race . . . . [and] it makes no differ-
ence whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. This 
was not true,” he emphasized, “of Germans and Italians. To the con-
trary,” he said, “[w]e needn’t worry about the Italians [and the 
Germans.] But we must worry about the Japanese all the time until 
he is wiped off the map.” After all, he added, “a Jap’s a Jap.”40 
Similar sentiments and words were expressed throughout the 
West Coast. But throughout this period, Attorney General Francis 
Biddle strongly opposed internment as “ill-advised, unnecessary, and 
unnecessarily cruel.”41 In late January, the California congressional 
delegation attempted to pressure Biddle to support internment. 
Biddle replied that he knew of no way in which “Japanese born in this 
country could [constitutionally] be interned.”42 
In the first two weeks of February, Biddle continued to argue the 
point. On February 7, over lunch with the President, he told 
Roosevelt that mass evacuation of Japanese Americans was inadvis-
able and impermissible, because “the army had offered ‘no reasons’ 
that would justify it as a military measure.”43 
 
37. Geoffrey R. Stone, It Can Happen Here: The 75th Anniversary of the 
Japanese Internment (Part I), HuffPost (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/entry/it-can-happen-here-the-75th-anniversary-of-the-
japanese_us_5a10b5e2e4b0e6450602eb9c [https://perma.cc/T2QW-QDGZ]; 
Jim Newton, Justice for All: Earl Warren and the Nation He 
Made 136 (2006). 
38. Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Okihiro, supra note 31, at 115; Francis 
Biddle, In Brief Authority 215 (1962). 
39. Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Biddle, supra note 38, at 215. 
40. Stone, supra note 1, at 292; Yamamoto et al., supra note 22, at 99; 
CWRIC, supra note 13, at 66. 
41. Stone, supra note 1, at 293; Biddle, supra note 38, at 213; John Leo, An 
Apology to Japanese Americans, Time (June 24, 2001), http://content. 
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,149131,00.html [https://perma.cc/ 
EMY7-99FV]. 
42. Stone, supra note 1, at 293; Biddle, supra note 38, at 215. 
43. Geoffrey R Stone, War and Liberty, an American Dilemma: 1970 
to the Present 71 (2007); Irons, supra note 17, at 53.  
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Two days later, he wrote Secretary of War Henry Stimson that 
the Department of Justice would not “under any circumstances” par-
ticipate in the internment of American citizens on the basis of race.44 
Biddle informed Stimson that J. Edgar Hoover had concluded that 
the demand for mass evacuation was based on nothing more than 
“public hysteria”45 that the FBI had already taken into custody all 
suspected Japanese agents, and that Hoover himself had accused 
General DeWitt of “getting a bit hysterical.”46 
But the public clamor on the West Coast continued to build. The 
American Legion, the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West, 
the California Farm Bureau Federation, the Chamber of Commerce of 
Los Angeles, and all the West Coast newspapers cried out for the 
prompt removal of Japanese aliens and citizens alike.47 
The attorney general of Washington chimed in that he favored 
the removal of all “citizens of Japanese extraction” and the attorney 
general of Idaho announced that all Japanese Americans should “be 
put in concentration camps for the remainder of the war,” adding 
pointedly, “we want to keep this a white man’s country.”48 
On February 14, General DeWitt officially recommended that all 
persons of Japanese extraction should be removed from “sensitive 
areas.”49 Shortly thereafter, Attorney General Biddle spoke with 
Roosevelt by phone. At the end of the conversation, a dejected Biddle 
agreed that he would no longer resist the mass incarceration of 
Japanese Americans.50 According to Biddle, his Justice Department 
lawyers were “devastated.”51 
A few days later, on February 19, President Franklin Roosevelt 
signed Executive Order 9066.52 The matter was never discussed in the 
cabinet, and the President did not consult his primary military advis-
ors, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.53 
 
44. Stone, supra note 43, at 71; Biddle, supra note 38, at 218. 
45. Stone, supra note 43, at 71; Don Whitehead, The FBI Story: A 
Report to the People 189 (1956). 
46. Stone, supra note 43, at 71; Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and 
Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover 249 (1987); Irons, supra note 
17, at 28.  
47. Stone, supra note 43, at 72: Biddle, supra note 38, at 217. 
48. Stone, supra note 43, at 72; Cray, supra note 28, at 120; Irons, supra 
note 17, at 72. 
49. Stone, supra note 43, at 72; Cray, supra note 28, at 120. 
50. Stone, supra note 43, at 72; Irons, supra note 17, at 62. 
51. Stone, supra note 43, at 72; Irons, supra note 17, at 62. 
52. Exec. Order No. 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (Cum. Supp. 1943). 
53. Stone, supra note 43, at 72–73; see Irons, supra note 17, at 56–65. 
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The public rationale for the decision, laid out in General DeWitt’s 
Final Report on the Evacuation of the Japanese from the West Coast, 
was that time was of the essence and that the government had no rea-
sonable way to distinguish loyal from disloyal persons of Japanese 
descent.54  
This report has rightly been condemned as a travesty.55 It relied 
upon unsubstantiated and even fabricated assertions; the FBI had, in-
deed, already taken into custody those individuals it suspected of po-
tential subversion, and two weeks before Roosevelt signed the 
Executive Order, General Mark Clark and Admiral Harold Stark 
testified before a House committee that the danger of a Japanese at-
tack on the West Coast was “effectively nil.”56 The argument of mili-
tary necessity was simply not credible. 
II 
Why, then, did Franklin Roosevelt sign the Executive Order? 
Robert Jackson, who had served as Roosevelt’s Attorney General 
before being appointed to the Supreme Court, once observed that 
Roosevelt was a “strong skeptic of legal reasoning” and, despite his 
reputation, was not a “strong champion of civil rights. He had the 
tendency,” Jackson said, “to think in terms of right and wrong, in-
stead of legal and illegal. [And b]ecause he thought his motives were 
always good for the things that he wanted to do, he found difficulty in 
thinking that there could be legal limitations on them.”57 
Jackson’s successor, Attorney General Francis Biddle, also specu-
lated about why Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9,066. “I do not 
think,” he said, that “he was much concerned with the gravity or im-
plications of this step. He was never theoretical about things. The 
military might be wrong. But they were fighting the war [and p]ublic 
opinion was on their side,”58 so “there was no question of any 
 
54. Stone, supra note 43, at 73; John DeWitt, Final Report: Japanese 
Evacuation from the West Coast, at vii (1942). 
55. Stone, supra note 43, at 73; Lorraine K. Bannai, Enduring 
Conviction: Fred Korematsu and His Quest for Justice 85 (2015). 
56. Stone, supra note 1, at 295; Robinson, supra note 20, at 110. 
57. Stone, supra note 1, at 295; Robert Jackson, That Man: An 
Insider's Portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt 74 (2003). 
58. Stone, supra note 1, at 296; Geoffrey R. Stone, It Can Happen Here: The 
75th Anniversary of the Japanese Internment, Part II, HuffPost (Nov. 
19, 2017, 6:34 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/it-can-happen-
here-the-75th-anniversary-of-the-japanese_us_5a121186e4b023121e0e9439 
[https://perma.cc/YZ3L-V4PN]; Biddle, supra note 38, at 219. 
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substantial opposition [to the order].”59 Undoubtedly, public opinion 
played a key role in the thinking of both the military and the 
President. 
In fact, there was almost no public protest of Roosevelt’s decision.  
Even most civil liberties groups stayed relatively quiet. Although 
Roosevelt explained the order in terms of military necessity, there is 
little doubt that domestic politics played a key role in his thinking, 
particularly because 1942 was an election year and Roosevelt was 
hardly immune to politics. 
As the legal historian Peter Irons has observed, the internment 
decision “illustrates the dominance of politics over law” in a wartime 
setting.60 In his speculation about Roosevelt’s thinking, Biddle noted 
that, “ultimately, the Supreme Court must decide the issue.”61 And, 
indeed, so it did, in a series of critical decisions addressing the con-
stitutionality of different aspects of the military orders. 
III 
In June [of] 1943, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Hirabayashi v. United States.62 Gordon Hirabayashi was born in 1918 
in Auburn, Washington.63 His father ran a roadside fruit market.64 His 
parents were pacifists.65 He attended the University of Washington, 
where he assumed a leadership role in the YMCA and the Japanese 
Students Club.66 In the summer of 1940, he traveled to New York 
City to attend a program at Columbia University, where he partici-
pated in passionate debates about pacifism and social activism.67 
After President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, 
Hirabayashi, with the assistance of a local legislator and the local 
ACLU, decided to challenge the constitutionality of General DeWitt’s 
curfew order by intentionally violating the order and then turning 
 
59. Stone, supra note 1, at 296; Stone, supra note 58; Biddle, supra note 38, 
at 219. 
60. Stone, supra note 1, at 296; Stone, supra note 58; Irons, supra note 17, at 
42. 
61. Stone, supra note 1, at 297; Stone, supra note 58; Biddle, supra note 38, 
at 219. 
62. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
63. Stone, supra note 1, at 297; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 84. 
64. Stone, supra note 1, at 297; Irons, supra note 17, at 89. 
65. Stone, supra note 1, at 297; Irons, supra note 17, at 89. 
66. Stone, supra note 1, at 297; Irons, supra note 17, at 89. 
67. Stone, supra note 1, at 297; Irons, supra note 17, at 89. 
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himself in to the FBI.68 The case made its way to the Supreme Court 
and Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone wrote the opinion of the Court 
upholding Hirabayashi’s conviction.69 
Although Stone observed privately that he was shocked that the 
United States had “subjected U.S. citizens to this treatment,” he 
nonetheless upheld the constitutionality of the curfew.70 “The war 
power of the national government,” he wrote, “is the power to wage 
war successfully. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the 
government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour 
such persons constituted a menace to the national defense and 
safety.”71 
Although conceding that “distinctions between citizens solely be-
cause of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free peo-
ple,” Stone nonetheless argued that,  
it by no means follows that, in dealing with the perils of war, 
Congress and the Executive are precluded from taking into 
account those facts and circumstances which are relevant to 
measures for our National Defense and which may, in fact, place 
citizens of one ancestry in a different category from others.72 
Justice Frank Murphy informed his colleagues that he intended to 
dissent, arguing that the guaranties of the Bill of Rights are not 
suspended by the mere existence of a state of war.73 Justice Felix 
Frankfurter, however, persuaded Murphy not to dissent, arguing that 
it would undermine “the great reputation of this Court” if Murphy 
were to accuse his colleagues of betraying the Constitution and “be-
having like the enemy.”74 
The following year, in Korematsu v. United States, 75 the Supreme 
Court upheld the Exclusion Order by a vote of six to three.76 Fred 
Korematsu was born in 1919 in Oakland, California.77 After gradu-
ating from high school, he worked as a shipyard welder. In June 1941, 
 
68.  Stone, supra note 1, at 298; Stone, supra note 58. 
69. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83, 105 (1943). 
70. Stone, supra note 37; Irons, supra note 17, at 232. 
71. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93, 99. 
72. Id. at 100. 
73. Stone, supra note 37; see also Irons, supra note 17, at 246. 
74. Stone, supra note 37; see also Irons, supra note 17, at 246. 
75. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
76. Id. at 224. 
77. Stone, supra note 43, at 76; Irons, supra note 17, at 93–94. 
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he sought to enlist in the U.S. Navy, but was turned down because of 
gastric ulcers.78 On May 30, 1942, the police in California stopped and 
questioned Korematsu, who was then walking down the street with 
his girlfriend.79 He said he was of Spanish-Hawaiian origin.80 
The police took him in for questioning, and he then admitted his 
real name and nationality.81 He explained that the rest of his family 
had been sent to an internment center, located in a converted race-
track, but that he had not reported, because he was trying to earn 
enough money to move to the Midwest with his girlfriend, who was 
Italian.82 He maintained that General DeWitt’s Exclusion Order was 
unlawful.83 His case too made it to the Supreme Court.84 
Justice Hugo Black delivered the opinion for the majority.85 “We 
cannot reject as unfounded,” he said, “the judgment of the military 
authorities that there were disloyal members of the Japanese Ameri-
can population, whose number and strength could not be precisely 
and quickly ascertained. We are not unmindful of the hardships im-
posed upon a large group of American citizens, but hardships,” he 
wrote, “are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.”86 
“All citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of 
war in greater or lesser measure,” he added, “and to cast this case in-
to outlines of racial prejudice confuses the issue. Korematsu was not 
excluded from the West Coast because of any hostilities of his race, 
but because the military authorities decided that the urgency of this 
situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be 
segregated from the area. We cannot,” he concluded, “by availing our-
selves of the calm perspective of hindsight, now say that at that time 
these actions were unjustified.”87 
The three dissenting justices were Owen Roberts, Frank Murphy, 
and Robert Jackson.88 Justice Roberts argued that it was patently 
 
78. Stone, supra note 43, at 76; Irons, supra note 17, at 94. 
79. Stone, supra note 43, at 76; Irons, supra note 17, at 93. 
80. Stone, supra note 37; Irons, supra note 17, at 93. 
81. Stone, supra note 37; Irons, supra note 17, at 94–95. 
82. Stone, supra note 37; Irons, supra note 17, at 94–95. 
83. Stone, supra note 37. 
84. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
85. Id. at 215. 
86. Stone, supra note 37; Stone, supra note 43, at 76; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 
218–19. 
87. Stone, supra note 37; Stone, supra note 43, at 76; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 
219, 223–24. 
88. Stone, supra note 43, at 77; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 225, 233, 242. 
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unconstitutional for the government to insist that individuals submit 
“to imprisonment in a concentration camp” for no reason other than 
their “ancestry.”89 
Justice Murphy wrote a particularly angry dissent. “No adequate 
reason is given,” he said, “for the failure to treat these Japanese 
Americans on an individual basis by holding investigations and hear-
ings to separate the loyal from the disloyal, as was done in the case of 
German and Italian individuals.”90 “Moreover,” he added, “there was 
no adequate proof that the Federal Bureau of Investigation and mili-
tary and naval intelligence services did not have the espionage and 
sabotage situation well in hand during this period.”91 The government, 
Murphy charged, had gone beyond “the very brink of constitutional 
power” and had fallen into the “ugly abyss of racism.”92 
IV 
On December 17, 1944, the Roosevelt Administration announced 
that it would end the internment and release the internees.93 There 
had been a lengthy struggle within the Administration about when to 
end the internment. In December of 1943, Attorney General Biddle 
strenuously argued for the immediate release of all loyal Japanese 
Americans.94 In May 1944, Secretary of War Stimson made it clear to 
Roosevelt that the internment could be ended “without any danger to 
defense considerations.”95 
Nonetheless, the President chose to postpone the decision, ex-
plaining that “the whole problem, for the sake of internal quiet, 
should be handled gradually.”96 In plain truth, Roosevelt did not want 
to release the internees until after the 1944 presidential election, be-
cause such a decision might upset voters on the West Coast.97 
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In the years immediately after World War II, attitudes about the 
Japanese internment began to shift. In the Evacuation Claims Act of 
1948, Congress authorized compensation for specific property losses 
suffered by the internees.98 Several factors spurred the enactment of 
this legislation, including the growing sense of guilt and international 
condemnation of the internment.99 The process for obtaining compen-
sation was agonizingly slow, however. By 1958, only 26,000 internees 
had received any compensation.100 Moreover, as one critic acidly ob-
served, “[t]he goal of the program was not to offer reparations for the 
moral, constitutional, reputational, and dignitary wrongs done to 
Japanese Americans, but only to compensate them for lost ‘pots and 
pans.’”101 
Many participants in the Japanese internment reflected on the 
roles they played. Some knew at the time that internment was uncon-
stitutional and immoral. In April of 1942, Milton Eisenhower—Dwight 
Eisenhower’s brother—who was the national director of the War 
Relocation Administration, which was responsible for running the de-
tention camps, lamented that “When this war is over, we, as Ameri-
cans, are going to regret the injustices” we have done.102 Two months 
later, as a matter of principle, he resigned his position.103 
Francis Biddle, who had vigorously and consistently opposed in-
ternment, continued to deplore the government’s action.104 In 1962, he 
wrote that internment had “subjected Americans to the shame of 
being classed as enemies of their native country without any evidence 
indicating disloyalty.”105 He observed that, unlike citizens of German 
and Italian descent, “Japanese Americans were treated as ‘untouch-
ables,’ as a group that could not be trusted and had to be [impris-
oned] only because they were of Japanese descent.”106 
In 1974, former Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had played a 
pivotal role in the Japanese internment as California’s attorney 
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general, conceded that Japanese internment was “not in keeping with 
our American concept of freedom and the rights of citizens.”107 In later 
years, he admitted privately that he regretted his own actions in the 
matter.108 
Moreover, the Court’s decisions in Hirabayashi and Korematsu 
became constitutional pariahs. Indeed, the Supreme Court has never 
cited either decision with approval of its result. 
Over the years, the immorality of the Japanese American intern-
ment has continued to reverberate. As part of the celebration of the 
Bicentennial of the Constitution in 1976, President Gerald Ford is-
sued a Presidential Proclamation in which he acknowledged that we 
must recognize “our national mistakes as well as our national achieve-
ments.”109 “February 19,” he noted, “is the anniversary of a sad day in 
American history,” for it was “on that date in 1942, that the 
Executive Order 9066 was issued.”110 Ford observed that “we now 
know what we should have known then,” that the evacuation and in-
ternment of loyal Japanese Americans was “wrong.”111 
In 1983, the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment 
of Civilians, which Congress had created to review the implemen-
tation of Executive Order 9066, unanimously concluded that the fac-
tors that shaped the internment decision “were race prejudice, war 
hysteria and a failure of political leadership,” not military necessity.112 
That same year, Fred Korematsu and Gordon Hirabayashi filed 
petitions to have their convictions set aside for “manifest injustice.”113 
A year later, federal Judge Marilyn Patel granted Korematsu’s peti-
tion.114 Patel found that in its presentation of evidence to the federal 
courts in the course of Korematsu’s prosecution and appeal, including 
in the Supreme Court, the government had “knowingly and inten-
tionally failed to disclose critical information that directly contra-
dicted key statements on which the government had asked the Courts 
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to rely.”115 Judge Patel observed that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Korematsu “stands as a constant caution that in times of war or de-
clared military necessity, our institutions must be vigilant in protect-
ing constitutional guarantees.”116 
Three years later, a federal Court of Appeals vacated Gordon 
Hirabayashi’s conviction.117 In an opinion by Judge Mary Schroeder, 
the court found serious deceit in the United States’ presentation of its 
case to the Supreme Court.118 Judge Schroeder found that the original 
version of Judge DeWitt’s final report, which was designed to justify 
the military orders, did not “purport to rest on any military exigency, 
but instead declared unequivocally that because of traits peculiar to 
citizens of Japanese ancestry, it would be impossible to separate the 
loyal from the disloyal.”119 When officials of the War Department 
received DeWitt’s report in early 1942, they ordered him to excise the 
racist overtones and to add statements of military necessity.120 Copies 
of the original report were then burned.121 
When officials of the Department of Justice were preparing to 
argue the Hirabayashi case in the Supreme Court, they sought all 
materials relevant to General DeWitt’s decision-making, but the War 
Department did not disclose to the Justice Department the original 
version of the report.122 Judge Schroeder found that, given the impor-
tance the justices attached to the government’s claims of military ne-
cessity in Hirabayashi and Korematsu, “[t]he reasoning of the 
Supreme Court would probably have been profoundly affected had it 
been advised of the suppression of evidence that would have estab-
lished unequivocally the real reason for the Exclusion Order.”123 
In the last year of this presidency, Ronald Reagan signed the Civil 
Liberties Act of 1988, which officially declared that the Japanese in-
ternment was a “grave injustice,” explained that the program of 
exclusion and internment had been “motivated largely by racial 
prejudice,” and offered an official Presidential apology and reparations 
to each of the Japanese American internees who had suffered 
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“discrimination, deprivation of liberty, loss of property, and personal 
humiliation at the hands of the U.S. government.”124 
V 
I would like to close with a final note about Fred Korematsu. For 
the rest his life, Korematsu continued to challenge what he saw as the 
abuse of government authority.125 In 1998, President Bill Clinton hon-
ored him with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest honor 
the United States can bestow upon a citizen.126 In the fall of 2003, to 
my astonishment, Fred Korematsu contacted me. 
The Supreme Court was about to hear the case of Rasul v. 
Bush.127 Rasul and others had been captured during the United States 
invasion of Afghanistan after the 9/11 attack on the United States.128 
Rasul claimed that he was not a member of the Taliban, but was with 
them at the time of his capture because he was being held by them as 
a prisoner.129 The government designated Rasul an enemy combatant, 
however, and shipped him off to the military base in Guantanamo 
Bay.130 
The Bush Administration denied Rasul access to counsel, the 
right to a trial, and any knowledge of the charges against him.131 A 
group of independent lawyers then brought suit in federal court claim-
ing that this procedure violated Rasul’s constitutional rights.132 When 
the case made its way to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
Fred Korematsu reached out to me, because I had recently published 
a book on civil liberties in wartime.133 He asked me to write an amicus 
curiae brief to the Supreme Court in his name. It was, as you might 
expect, a great honor for me to have had the opportunity to do so. 
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Fred Korematsu died a few months after the Supreme Court ruled 
in favor of Rasul, holding that the United States government had 
violated his right to petition the federal courts for a writ of habeas 
corpus.134 I would like to think that Fred Korematsu’s name on that 
brief served powerfully to remind the Justices of the Court’s own past 
failures and inspired them not to make the same mistake again. 
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